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Abstract 
We present a general architecture for the 
monitoring and diagnosis of large scale 
sensor-based systems with real time diagnos­
tic constraints. This architecture is multi­
leveled, combining a single monitoring level 
based on statistical methods with two model­
based diagnostic levels. At each level, sources 
of uncertainty are identified, and integrated 
methodologies for uncertainty management 
are developed. The general architecture was 
applied to the monitoring and diagnosis of a 
specific nuclear physics detector at Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory that contained 
approximately 5000 components and pro­
duced over 500 channels of output data. The 
general architecture is scalable, and work is 
ongoing to apply it to detector systems one 
and two orders of magnitude more complex. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Time of Flight Scintillation Array is a sub-at?mic 
particle detector used at Lawrence Berkeley N atwnal 
Laboratory (LBL) for studies in relativistic he3:vy-ion 
physics. With operating costs for these expenmen
�
s 
exceeding $60 000 per hour, it is important that this 
detector oper�te correctly, and that any failures be 
identified and remediated as quickly as possible. But 
with approximately 5000 components, and over 500 
output channels producing a Mbyte of data every 10 
seconds the monitoring and diagnosis of this detector 
system \s difficult for human operators to accomplish 
within the real time constraints. 
While the automation of the monitoring and diagnos­
tic process was desirable, the scale of the Time of 
Flight Scintillation Array combined with real time con­
straints and uncertain system relationships presented 
a particular challenge to automated monitoring and di­
agnosis. The scale of the detector requires the average 
time spent monitoring an individual output channel 
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(or probe) and diagnosing an indivi?ual compo�ent 
be small in order to meet the real time constramts. 
The uncertain nature of the relationship between the 
output data and the component states indicates an ev­
idential reasoning approach, which may be contrary to 
the small average time requirement if applied to every 
component. 
We present a general multi-level �r.ch!tecture. devel­oped to efficiently and non-determimstJcally diagnose 
large scale sensor-based. systems _
in real. time, and d�­scribe the implementatiOn of this architecture to di­
agnose the Time of Flight Scin�illa.tion Array. The diagnostic system, the TOF Vah?atwn System, com­
bines a single monitoring level wit� two model-?ased 
diagnostic reasoning levels to prov1d.e both effiCiency and robustness in the face of uncertamty. The system 
consists of: 1) a statistical monitoring level using tradi­
tional chi-squared testing on data samples; 2) a model­
based reasoning level operating on Boolean channel 
states (OK and BAD) with a data base of connec­
tivity information to produce an ordered, reduced set 
of suspect components; and 3) a model-based reason­
ing level that extracts considerably more information 
from the data channels, and uses qualitative behav­
ioral system information operating on the reduced set 
of suspect components to produce an evidential map­
ping to individual component failure state beliefs. The 
system systematically extracts more information from 
a reduced set of channels to provide a more detailed 
diagnosis. The system was developed to be scalable to 
diagnose similar detector system� two orde.rs o! mag­nitude more complex, and ongomg work IS directed 
toward extending the system for use on a Time Pro­
jection Chamber at LBL and for possible use on the 
Superconducting Supercollider. 
We believe the TOF Validation System is unique 
among sensor-based diagnostic expert systems devel­
oped to date, first due to the scale and complexity �f 
the TOF Scintillation Array, second due to the multi­
level nature of it's diagnostic reasoning, and third 
in the consideration and management of uncertainty 
at all levels of reasoning. The general methodology 
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should be applicable to a broad range of monitoring 
and diagnostic problems where at least a qualitative 
model of the system is known. 
In the following sections we will discuss other related 
research, describe the TOF Scintillation Array, present 
the general diagnostic system architecture, then dis­
cuss the management of uncertainty at the individual 
levels. We also describe the implementation of the 
generalized architecture and methodologies to develop 
the TOF Validation System. 
2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
In the development of an automated real-time sensor­
based multi-level monitoring and diagnostic system, 
a broad variety of research and implementation issues 
must be addressed and so there exists a wealth of prior 
research work that is relevant to this research. This 
work builds on that of Agogino (1988a, b) and Rege 
(1986) in the area of real time sensor-based diagnostic 
expert systems. Rege describes IDES (Influence Dia­
gram Expert System) and an application to a simple 
sensor-based pump diagnostic problem. Agogino de­
scribes the application ofiDES to the real time sensor­
based diagnosis of a milling machine and Ramamurthy 
(1990) to drilling applications. 
Our view of multi-level diagnostic knowledge is similar 
to that of Milne (1985, 1987), who states that the diag­
nostic knowledge can exist at one or more of four levels: 
compiled, functional, behavioral and structural . Al­
though compiled diagnostic knowledge systems often 
implicitly contain knowledge about structure and/or 
function, it is the explicit use of structural, behavioral 
or functional knowledge that delineates those diagnos­
tic knowledge systems. Milne states that "the basic 
knowledge required for diagnosis is the set of malfunc­
tions and relations between the observations and mal­
functions". A compiled knowledge diagnostic system 
is a system that has this knowledge explicitly given to 
it. A structural diagnostic system is a system that is 
explicitly given structural or connectivity information, 
and likewise functional and behavioral diagnostic sys­
tems are explicitly given functional or behavioral in­
formation. While Milne uses multiple levels to catego­
rize knowledge representation, we have explicitly used 
these same levels to describe a diagnostic architecture. 
Chandrasekaran (1983), Davis (1983), Fink (1985a, b, 
1987), and Searl (1987) all address compiled verses 
deep (structural, behavioral and functional) knowledge 
based diagnosis. The research by Fink is particularly 
relevant to this research in that she describes a system 
that combines knowledge from more than one level, 
although the application described in that research 
is several orders of magnitude simpler than the TOF 
Scintillation Array. Searl makes explicit use of both 
structure and function in the development of the di­
agnostic expert system for the space shuttle described 
in Searl (1985). 
When a diagnostic reasoning system depends on sen­
sor information, the problem of sensor validation must 
be addressed. Chandrasekaran (1988) addresses sen­
sor validation in compiled systems, and introduces a 
"meta-level" of compiled information that constitutes 
a level of redundancy based on expectations derived 
during diagnosis. Searl (1987) shows that with the use 
of knowledge of structure and function one is able to 
regard sensor validation as a subset of the more gen­
eral diagnostic process and therefore validate sensors 
the same as diagnosing any other component, an ob­
servation that we were able to confirm in this research. 
3 TIME OF FLIGHT 
SCINTILLATION ARRAY 
The TOF Scintillation Array is part of the Heavy Ion 
Superconducting Spectrometer (HISS) experiments at 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. The TOF Scintilla­
tion Array consists of 136 plastic scintillation slats, 
272 photomultiplier tubes, and associated electron­
ics. As atomic particles produced by an experimental 
"event" pass through a particular slat, light photons 
are produced. The duration of an event is measured 
in nanoseconds, and the associated photons migrate 
to the ends of the slat and the produce electrical sig­
nals in the two photomultiplier tubes that are ampli­
fied 106 times. The signal is split and sent to both 
an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) and a Time 
to Digital Converter (TDC). Digital outputs from the 
ADCs and TDCs are sent directly to magnetic tape, 
although sampling is possible. Because of the tremen­
dous amount of data produced by and the scale of the 
TOF Scintillation Array, it can be difficult to monitor 
and diagnose even for an expert in the Wall's oper­
ation. Proposed detector systems for the Supercon­
ducting Supercollider would be humanly impossible to 
monitor and diagnose without assistance. 
4 SYSTEM ARCHITEC TURE 
Difficulty in diagnosing large scale systems comes from 
a combination of both the complexity of the system 
and from the external constraints on the time al­
lowed for diagnosis. Diagnostic systems using com­
piled knowledge (such as heuristic, rule-based systems) 
are difficult to implement for large scale systems due 
to the difficulties in acquiring and implementing large 
numbers of rules, rule conflict resolution, and difficul­
ties in updating and appending the rule base. Also, 
as the number of rules increases, diagnostic time can 
increase. If the time to diagnose a failure is of little 
or no concern, then large, complex rule based systems 
may be a viable option, but this is not the case for this 
application. 
When a system model is available, model based diag­
nostic systems can provide increased flexibility in han­
dling system changes. But if the reasoning strategies 
applied to the entire system are too complex, model 
based diagnostic systems may also require too much 
time when diagnosing large scale systems. 
The generalizable architecture we propose for large 
scale sensor-based systems closely mimics the meth­
ods by which an expert might diagnose a problem: 
first a quick look at all the probe outputs to get a gen­
eral idea of what components might have failed, then a 
more detailed look at specific probes to determine the 
exact component and the specific failure type. This 
architecture consist of four main functional modules 
as shown in Figure 1. 
system 
monitor 
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;:::::::r==�==�====� module 
compiled 
diagnoser 
•-.--ldiagnastic and 
,- repair 
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module 
compiled 
reasoning 
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Figure 1: Large Scale System Diagnostic Architecture 
A monitoring module would sample the probe (sensor) 
outputs, comparing these outputs to historical values. 
'When the monitoring module detects an abnormal­
ity, the structural reasoning module is alerted. Us­
ing a connectivity model of the system and the probe 
output comparisons from the statistical analyzer, the 
structural reasoning module performs a "rough cut" 
diagnosis that produces a short list of suspect com­
ponents. This short list is sent to the behavioral rea­
soning module. Using the short list of suspect compo-
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nents, this module retrieves the original probe outputs 
of all probes related to these components from the sta­
tistical analyzer, and using a functional model of the 
system produces a list of specific failure types for spe­
cific suspect components, ordered by degree of belief. 
A compiled reasoning model provides assistance in in­
terpretation and repair. 
Possible applications of this architecture include sen­
sor validation in process control, fault location in com­
plex electomechanical systems and control of food or 
chemical proccessing. We have applied this architec­
ture to the monitoring and diagnosis of the Time of 
Flight Scintillation Array. In this implementation of 
the architecture, a data acquisition and signal process­
ing unit compiles averages for ADC and TDC values 
for 1000 events, and a statistical analyzer compares 
these averages to archived values from the expected 
value generator with a chi-squared test. Probes that 
fail the test are flagged as "BAD", and the structural 
reasoning module started. This module assumes struc­
tural dependencies among the components based on 
connectivity (structure). 
The term " structural dependency" in this context 
means that the effective state of a component is de­
pendent on a preceding component. This dependency 
could occur when a component provides a data output 
that is the data input to a succeeding component, or if 
a component cannot operate if the preceding compo­
nent has failed (such as when the preceding component 
supplies power to the succeeding component). 
From the list of " BAD" probes from the statistical an­
alyzer, and connectivity knowledge stored in the con­
nectivity model, the structural diagnoser produces a 
short list of suspect components. The behavioral di­
agnosis module is then started with the list of suspect 
components. For each suspect component, this mod­
ule solicits additional information from the statistical 
analyzer about trending of data from select groups of 
probes affected by the components under considera­
tion, and compares those trends to expected trend­
ing (from the behavioral model) for individual failure 
types for the specific class of component using eviden­
tial algorithms. The final list of suspect components, 
with the types of failure, is presently sent directly to 
an output display. The compiled reasoning module has 
not been implemented. 
5 MANAGEMENT OF 
UNCERTAINTY AT THE 
MONIT ORING LEVEL 
The monitoring module addresses the question of 
whether the Time of Flight Scintillation Array is func­
tioning correctly or not. Uncertainty exists at this 
level due to the highly stochastic nature of particle 
physics experiments. 
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In this case the monitoring process is abetted by the 
tremendous amount of data produced by the exper­
iment. Samples of statistically significant size (typi­
cally 1000 events) can be collected rapidly. These sam­
ples are compared to expected norms (10 samples of 
1000 events collected with the system assumed to be 
functioning correctly) using standard chi-square test­
ing. These tests establish whether an individual data 
probe is OK or BAD. Statistical analysis validated the 
suitability of the chi-square test for determining the 
state of a probe (Paasch 1990). 
6 MANAGEMENT OF 
UNCERTAINTY AT THE 
STRUC TURAL REASONING 
LEVEL 
The structural reasoning module has the responsibil­
ity for reducing the set of suspect components from a 
set of all components in the system to a set that can 
be efficiently diagnosed by the behavioral reasoning 
module within the real time constraints. The largest 
reduction in the suspect set occurs in this module. In 
the TOF Validation System, this module reduces the 
suspect component set from 5000 components to ap­
proximately 10. Detailed information on this module 
is included in Hall (1989). 
The structural reasoning module assumes two possible 
component states (OK and BAD), and two possible 
observations per observation probe (OK and BAD). 
We justify this simplification of component states on 
the basis of highest common denominator. All compo­
nents can use OK and BAD, while failure type may be 
component specific. Also, in the structural reasoning 
module a rough diagnosis is acceptable, and the lump­
ing of components into either OK or BAD is sufficient. 
As for the observations per probe, OK or BAD may 
be all the information available from some extracted 
features such as the chi-square test used by the moni­
toring module. 
Uncertainty in the probe state is addressed at the mon­
itoring level by statistical methods. Uncertainty in the 
component state is addressed to some degree at this 
level, and again at the behavioral reasoning level. At 
this level we deterministically assume that if a compo­
nent has all dependent probes in state OK then that 
component is in state OK and is removed as a sus­
pect. This assumption is justified by the statistical 
significance of the sample size used in the monitoring 
module. 
If a component has one or more dependent probes in 
state BAD, then that component can be included as 
a suspect. Uncertainty about the individual states of 
the components on the reduced suspect list can be han­
dled by ranking the suspect components by the BAD 
probe to total probe ratio: a component with four 
probes dependent upon it and three of those probes 
assumed BAD would rank ahead of a component with 
eight dependent probes of which four are BAD .. Mul­
tiple component failures would increase the size of the 
suspect list. The possibility of multiple failures would 
decrease with the time to collect a sample. 
If two or more suspect components have identical sig­
natures (affect the same probes) we cannot discrimi­
nate between component failures, an ambiguity would 
exist, and thus would present a failure class. For the 
TO F Scintillation Array the worst case is three am­
biguous states (i.e. single components failures). Com­
piled information in the form of prior probabilities can 
handle this ambiguity, or a secondary diagnosis (de­
tailed in the next section) can be performed. 
7 MANAGEMENT OF 
UNCERTAINTY AT THE 
BEHAVIORAL REASONING 
LEVEL 
Although the structural reasoning module efficiently 
produces a limited set of suspect components and can 
order that list, a more detailed diagnosis may be de­
sired. The structural reasoning module is sensitive to 
the breakpoint value between BAD and OK channels, 
in the best of circumstances it may produce a sus­
pect component list with some ambiguity, and it pro­
vides no information the specific type of component 
failure. The behavioral reasoning module was incor­
porated into the general architecture to address these 
problems. This module by itself would be adequate for 
the diagnosis of small scale systems, but is too compu­
tationally inefficient to operate on a large set of suspect 
components in real time. 
With the apparent complexity of the system greatly 
reduced, the behavior module can operate in numer­
ous ways. The behavioral reasoning architecture we 
present incorporates a behavioral model to produce 
expected observation values for the different failure 
types, a methodology to compare expected values to 
actual values, and a methodology to relate that com­
parison to the system states. In the TOF Validation 
System, the later two methodologies are implemented 
in the behavioral diagnoser. 
The behavioral model can exist on many different lev­
els. The compilation of historical data, keeping track 
of failures by type, would result in a compiled behav­
ioral model relating system state directly to observ­
ables. At this level the knowledge would be consid­
ered shallow: compiled knowledge of system operation 
as a whole, with little or no knowledge of deeper sys­
tem operation. At the other extreme would be the 
deep analytical model: every component in the sys­
tem, and every relationship between components is 
modeled analytically, with a resultant complex math-
ematical equation for the system rigorously relating 
system state to observables. Between these two ex­
tremes there are a number of possibilities, including 
qualitative models, data models based on experiential, 
first principle, compiled knowledge, and hybrid mod­
els. 
Numerical comparison methodologies such as chi­
square or Z distribution can work for numerical obser­
vations, and Boolean sensor outputs can be compared 
directly with expected outputs on a match/no-match 
basis, with the result mapped directly to increase or 
decrease a belief. 
Relational methodologies would generally involve some 
sort of mapping from comparison value to evidential 
value. This mapping could be as simple as a table 
look up, or could involve qualitative or quantitative 
relational algorithms. 
One possible feature of a behavioral reasoning mod­
ule, implemented in the TOF Validation System, is 
the continuous mapping made between data values and 
hypothesis belief. The structural reasoning module as­
sumes that belief is discrete, as this is a Boolean map­
ping. For example, if probability were used, p(t = 
BADly < limit) = 0 and p(t = BADly> limit) = 1, 
where t is a probe state, y is the probe data value, 
and "limit" is the established breakpoint between OK 
and BAD. But the argument can be made that the 
uncertainty mapping in this and other cases is contin­
uous. Intuitively, p(t = BADly) might increase as y 
increases. More importantly, we can relate the individ­
ual component failure states, si, to the probe values. 
For each evidence type for each hypothesis, an algo­
rithm could be found that relates p(sily) to the value of 
y. A plot of such an algorithm is shown in Figure 2. In 
this case the likelihood of the hypothesis, H, increases 
as the value of the feature, x, increases, but the like­
lihood might also decrease with an increasing feature 
value, or it might increase with any feature change, 
or be related in other ways. The tradeoff to using a 
continuous evidential approach may be computational 
complexity and the inability to invert. 
Evidential methodologies are used to combine the evi­
dence produced by the relational algorithms, and could 
be based on Bayesian probabilities, Certainty Factors 
and Dempster-Shafer, at the preference of the expert 
or system developers. Each individual observation 
contributes an individual belief or likelihood for each 
system state hypothesis, these are then combined to 
give a final belief or likelihood for each system state 
hypothesis. The final belief or likelihood for each sys­
tem state could then be used on either an absolute or 
relative basis. 
The behavioral reasoning module as implemented in 
the TOF Validation System uses numerical, relational 
and evidential sub-levels. A qualitative behavioral 
model is based on the experts first principle and expe-
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Figure 2: Increase in Belief Associated With Evidence 
Verses Strength of the Evidence 
riential knowledge of the TOF Scintillation Array. To 
compare current with expected data features a sim­
ple Z distribution comparison ( z= (x - xavg)/sx ) is 
used. The behavioral diagnoser then uses four continu­
ous quantitative relational algorithms, one for each ex­
pected direction of data trending (increasing, decreas­
ing, either direction, and no change) to relate t?e data 
to evidential belief. These algorithms are modified for 
individual component failure state/ data feature rela­
tionships by parameters to reflect the desired eviden­
tial weighting, slope and cutoff value as determined by 
the expert. The algorithms can be made to behave in 
a nearly discrete manner when appropriate. At the 
preference of the expert, the present implementation 
uses certainty factors as an evidential methodology. 
The conversion to Bayesian probabilities is straight­
forward with the addition of the assessment of prior 
probabilities (Beckerman 1986). 
8 IMPLEMENTATION 
The architecture was implemented by the development 
and testing of individual modules that were then com­
bined to form the TOF validation System. The data 
acquisition and signal processing unit was coded in a 
combination of FORTRAN and C. All other modules 
were coded in C. The system runs on the HISS experi­
ment's VAX computers operating under VMS. A more 
detailed description of the implementation and use of 
the validation system may be found in Hall (1989), 
Olson (1990), and Paasch (1988, 1990). 
9 SUMMARY 
This paper presents a multi-level diagnostic architec­
ture particularly well suited for the diagnosis of large 
scale systems with real time constraints. While the 
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idea of multi-level diagnosis is not new, we believe this 
system is unique in that the inherent complexity and 
scale of the application required that multiple levels 
be used in this case to achieve the requisite efficiency 
while maintaining diagnostic detail and the ability to 
manage uncertainty. 
In implementing a multi-level diagnostic system, we 
have found that the individual diagnostic levels have 
strengths and weaknesses that are complementary and 
generalizable. Structural reasoning systems can be 
fairly robust, and can be designed in a generic manner 
so that changes in the structure of the components are 
reflected as changes in a mapping database. Due to 
the inherent ambiguity, structural reasoning appears 
to best lend itself to a rough, first pass, preliminary 
diagnosis. Uncertainty at this level exists as ambigu­
ity between system states and as uncertainty in the 
probe feature value to symbolic value mapping. 
Behavioral reasoning systems, especially analytic sys­
tems derived from first and second engineering prin­
ciples and incorporating structural knowledge, can be 
very robust. The construction of a reasoning system 
from behavioral knowledge can be difficult, however, 
due to incomplete information on the operation of a 
complex system and the difficulty in rigorously map­
ping from evidence to belief. Uncertainty exists in this 
mapping, and in the accuracy of the system model. 
Behavioral reasoning systems might need to incorpo­
rated various levels of compiled behavioral informa­
tion, making the design of a general framework more 
difficult. 
We do not feel that compiled systems by themselves 
are appropriate for the diagnosis of real time large scale 
systems because of complexity and inflexibility. How­
ever, compiled reasoning levels have been considered 
for this application to interpret the output from the 
behavioral reasoning module and to guide the repair 
process. 
As the application of diagnostic reasoning systems to 
more complex systems becomes possible, it becomes 
apparent that these reasoning systems will incorpo­
rate a preprocessing level combined with multiple lev­
els of diagnostic reasoning: structural, behavioral, and 
compiled. Each level has specific strengths and weak­
nesses, and in this research a combination has proven 
to provide the most intelligent, efficient, flexible, and 
robust system for diagnosing large scale real-time sys­
tems like the TOF Scintillation Array and proposed 
detectors for the Superconducting Supercollider. 
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